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THE HONDRABLE EARL WARREN




We are proud to dedicate this issue of the Law Review to The
Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States.
Earl Warren came to the Court from California with a strong
reputation as an able Attorney General and Governor, but he had
never before served in a judicial capacity. As a moderate Repub-
lican, he had run for Vice President with Governor Thomas E.
Dewey in 1948. President Eisenhower appointed him as the four-
teenth Chief Justice of the United States in 1953. It was widely
assumed that a good and moderate Republican was being rewarded
for party loyalty.
However, from the very beginning, Earl Warren failed to fit any
stereotype. Instead he became the ideal Chief Justice: a leader set-
ting a high standard for the highest Court in the land. Earl Warren
abandoned partisan politics, moderate Republican or otherwise,
and became a force for fairness, for "Equal Justice Under Law."
Chief Justice Warren has been very simply a Constitutionalist.
However, that, considering the truly radical doctrines of equal-
ity embodied in that revolutionary document, remains extremely
inflamatory to this day. It seems clear that in future years the
decisions on individual liberties and civil rights of the "Warren
Court" will be recognized for their historical awareness, not for any
historical indifference. For underneath Earl Warren's opinions can
be found a deep recognition that the Constitution is a living docu-
ment, in need of preservation by a Court of understanding, con-
cern and compassion.
Consequently, the true and lasting monument to the Chief
Justice will be the impact of the decisions of the "Warren Court,"
many of which bear Earl Warren's name, for years to come. For
in the final analysis, the "Warren Court" has been dedicated to pro-
moting justice and protecting individual rights and that, ideally, is
what America is all about.
After fifteen years of service on the Court, Chief Justice Warren
sought retirement. Ironically, it was his greatest critics who pre-
vented the United States Senate from even voting on the question
of confirming the nominated successor. As a result, Earl Warren has
begun his sixteenth year on the Court as Chief Justice of the United
States. It is with deep respect and admiration that we wish him
many years of continued successful service.
In recognition of this good and gentle servant's past contribu-
tions and continuing endeavors, we are proud to dedicate this issue.
THE EDITORS
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TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
JUNE 26, 1968
My dear Mr. Chief Justice:
It is with the deepest regret that I learn of your desire to retire,
knowing how much the Nation has benefited from your service as
Chief Justice. However, in deference to your wishes, I will seek a
replacement to fill the vacancy in the office of Chief Justice that will
be occasioned when you depart. With your agreement, I will accept
your decision to retire effective at such time as a successor is quali-
fied.
You have won for yourself the esteem of your fellow citizens. You
have served your nation with exceptional distinction and deserve
the Nation's gratitude.
Under your leadership, the Supreme Court of the United States
has once again demonstrated the vitality of this Nation's institutions
and their capacity to meet with vigor and strength the challenge of
changing times. The Court has acted to achieve justice, fairness, and
equality before the law for all people.
Your wisdom and strength will inspire generations of Americans
for many decades to come.
Fortunately, retirement does not mean that you will withdraw from
service to your Nation and to the institutions of the law. I am sure
that you will continue, although retired from active service as Chief
Justice, to respond to the calls which will be made upon you to furn-
ish continued inspiration and guidance to the development of the
rule of law both internationally and in our own Nation. Nothing is
more important than this work which you undertook so willingly
and have so well advanced.
Sincerely,
/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson
The Honorable Earl Warren
The Chief Justice
of the United States
Washington, D. C.
DEDICATION
DEDICATION TO CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN
Those of us who have served with Earl Warren are too close to
make an enduring historic judgment of the role of the man in the
sweep of American history.
Many of us, however, feel that in time he will be ranked with
Marshall and Hughes.
Earl Warren's life and experience belie the common assertion
that members of the Court should be chosen from the hierarchy of
federal courts or from state courts. It is only a myth that priorjudicial experience qualifies one for service on the Court.
The Court is in essence the referee of the federal system. No
other court has that role; and on no other court is experience as a
referee obtained.
Earl Warren's background was not only law but public admin-
istration and politics. These are experiences that season one's judg-
ment and enable him to see the powerful cross-currents at work in
a country of the size and diversity of the United States. The law of
the Constitution, as applied by the Court, is not to be found in
books alone but through insight into the actual operation of prin-
ciples as vague as "due process" and "equal protection." The law
books give a measure of the thinking of the prior age on these prob-
lems. Yet each generation faces not maintenance of the status quo
but adaptation and change to new conditions. It is that resilience
in our Constitution that has made it enduring. The process is time-
less and ageless. It is by that standard that Earl Warren will bejudged as Chief Justice.
That is why I think he will be classified with Marshall and
Hughes, who also saw the United States in large dimensions and
recognized that the quality of justice is the measure of a nation's
worth.
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DEDICATION TO
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
The history of a society is chronicled in its courts. Its greatness
is measured by the quality of its criminal justice.
Early societies determined criminal responsibility through com-
purgation; later through wager of battle, ordeal or torture; and,
finally, by one's peers.
The jury concept reached its attainment in Athenian days. The
Court of the Heliasts, while presided over by the King-Archon, was
attended by a jury varying from 101, 501 or 1001 talismen. The duty
of deciding guilt and assessing punishment was for the jury.
Socrates was found guilty of impiety and of corrupting Athenian
youth by a majority of 60 of 501 jurors who heard his case.
Some eighteen hundred and eighty years later, Joan of Arc was
tried for heresy before a French ecclesiastical court divined by
letters patent of Henry VI of England. She had neither counsel,
witnesses nor jury upon which to place herself. Indeed, the English
themselves, in order to secure jurisdiction over her person, bought
Joan from the custody of Philip of Burgundy for ten thousand
English pounds in gold, plus some fringe benefits. Found guilty of
claiming that she was sent by God with divine secrets given her by
St. Michael and St. Gabriel, she was burned at the stake.
Mary, Queen of Scots, was taken in custody in 1568 where she
remained until 1586 when she was formally charged by Elizabeth's
Commissioners. She was found guilty of aiding and abetting the
Conspiracy of Babington to overthrow the English throne and was
beheaded by a bungling executioner who took three thrusts of the
ax to consummate her sentence.
Galileo was convicted before the Holy See for espousing the
Copernican Theory, that the earth revolves around the sun. His
was also the offense of heresy, in that by submitting nature to law
he questioned God's free will. Unlike the fate suffered by Joan
of Arc convicted of a related offense, Galileo was confined to the
Pope's prison in the Holy Office on an indeterminate sentence.
By 1692 the Salem Witchcraft trials in New England were mute
evidence of the extent to which these punitive uses of the old
world had migrated to our shores. The hanging of countless women
and the peine forte et dure sentencing of men until they spoke or
died resulted without the benefit of counsel and solely through self-
incrimination.
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However, it was not too long before the colonists revealed that
their courage extended beyond voyaging to unknown shores. They
dared to destroy in the new world the growing restrictions that
royalty was placing on the printing press: the continual effort to
control speech and assembly. It was in 1737 that John Peter Zenger
suffered arrest in New York for seditious libeL He had printed the
truth about Governor Cosby. After waiting in jail for nine months
before he was tried, he came clear before a jury that had the courage
to find that his publication against the Governor was true and, there-
fore, not libelous. This was the dawn of a new day. A free press
began its never failing effort to inform the people and to reform
their processes. It was the start of the pamphleteer-whose be-
friending hand unlocked many a jail door and proved to be free-
dom's most potent weapon.
The result was that the Bill of Right's first amendment guar-
anteed freedom of speech, press and religion; the fourth protected
one's papers and effects from unreasonable search and seizure, the
fifth outlawed self-incrimination, the sixth granted the right to
counsel in criminal cases and the seventh secured the ancient
privilege of trial by jury. However, these safeguards ran against
the federal government alone. Not until over three quarters of a
century later-and then only after the Dred Scott decision had
removed the slavery issue from the political forum to the battle-
field-was the fourteenth amendment adopted. And even though
its due process clause protected the individual's "fundamental
rights, specially secured by the Federal Constitution 1 from invasion
by the State, the amendment proved to be little more than a symbol
of justice and equality. Indeed, the Court found as late as 1922-
54 years after the amendment's adoption-that "neither the 14th
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of the
United States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'free-
dom of speech'. ... ,,2
While the Court evidenced concern for the freedom of the in-
dividual from the "meddlesome interference" of the State in eco-
nomic matters, it again and again struck down legislation supporting
personal liberty, public welfare and national survival.3
One might say that it was not until 1925 that the fourteenth
amendment was given any force and effect as to human rights as
I Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905).
2 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
3 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Tyson & Brother
v. Bantons, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Ripnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928);
R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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distinguished from those to property. The break in the dike came in
Gitlow v. New York,4 where the Court declared the above language
of Prudential Insurance Co. to be merely an 'incidental' reference
and proceeded to assume-not to hold "the freedom of speech and
of the press.., are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment from impairment by the state." There followed a series of
cases that specifically applied the entire first amendment to the
States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
This is not to say that in the criminal field the Court gave the
amendment no recognitioxi. In Powell v. Alabama," the requirement
of counsel in state prosecutions in capital cases was announced.
This was followed in 1936 by Brown v. Mississippi,6 which con-
tinued the "special circumstances" doctrine of Powell. In Betts v.
Brady,7 the Court specifically held that the sixth amendment's
command as to assistance of counsel in criminal cases applied only
to federal trials and the "special circumstances" doctrine was made
the rule of decision in such cases. This created an anachronism in
the Constitution-its protections depended upon the gravity of the
circumstances and of the charge. This rule was to be the law of the
land for over a score of years.
Slight rays of light in the school segregation area only began
in 1938. In Gaines v. Canada," Missouri was required to admit
Gaines to its law school "in the absence of other and proper pro-
vision for his legal training within the State." This final thrust
by Chief Justice Hughes was most unfortunate. It extended for the
first time the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson9
to education and delayed the integration of public schools for some
twenty years.10 Tests of this doctrine, however, continued at the
graduate school level and in 1950 the leading case of Sweatt v.
Painter" found it inapposite and thereby paved the way for inte-
gration in not only the graduate but the preparatory schools.
Previously, in 1948, another landmark case in the area of segre-
gation had sparked hope for eventual equality in housing. Shelley
v. Kraemer,12 written by Chief Justice Vinson, declared that the
4 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
5 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
7316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).
9 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10 But cf. Cuming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
"1 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants in deeds was "state
action" prohibited by the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause. This was the forerunner of a series of cases coming on in
the sixties that have tempered the strict construction of the doctrine
of "state action" as enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases.13
Chief Justice Warren came to the Court at the beginning of the
October 1953 Term. He was 62 years old, was a graduate of the
University of California Law School and had been admitted to the
Bar since 1914. His public service began as a Clerk to the Judiciary
Committee of the California Assembly and embraced the offices of
Deputy City Attorney of Oakland, District Attorney of Alameda
County, Attorney General of California and Governor of the State
for eleven years, when President Eisenhower appointed him the
Chief Justice of the United States.
"Laissez faire" was the tag placed on the Court during the period
of the "nine old men." Not since the time of Chief Justice Fuller,
along with Justices Field and Brewer, had the Court followed the
"leave things as they are" course as conscientiously and faithfully.
In fact, it had been elevated into a constitutional policy. Beginning
with West Coast Hotels v. Parrish,14 and the line of cases overruling
Adkins, it was whittled down somewhat before Chief Justice War-
ren's appointment. This was especially true in the area of con-
gressional and executive action as well as "state action" in the
segregation field. However, as was true of the whittling on sticks
of old men sitting around town squares on Saturdays, there was
more talking done than whittling.
"Activist" is the handle given the Court under the Chief Justice-
ship of Earl Warren. But unlike an executive or a legislature, a
Court can hardly initiate action. Even though the Chief Justice's
long service in state office had been marked with progress in the
area of criminal justice and social improvement, he was faced with
a much different situation on the Court. As Chief Executive of the
state he could initiate action or seek statutory reform where nec-
essary. He did not have to wait or depend upon any one else. On
the Court he not only was obligated to wait-sometimes for years-
for cases to reach the Court and be prosecuted but after submission
he could do nothing affirmatively without the concurrence of at
least four other justices. But, purely by happenstance, the stage
had been set for action in the segregation field. When he arrived,
Brown v. Board of Education15 had been set for re-argument by an
18 109 U.S. 3 (1893). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966).
14 309 U.S. 379 (1937).
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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order of the Court dated June 8, 1953, along with four other cases
with which it had been consolidated.16 And it was argued on De-
cember 7th-9th, only 63 days after he took his seat. His unanimous
opinion for the Court in the case was announced five months later.
The Court overruled the old Plessy doctrine, which had been
seriously eroded, and extended the Sweatt case to the grade and
high schools. The Chief Justice depended not only upon McLaurin
v. Regents 7 and Sweatt but quoted with approval findings of the
trial courts of Kansas and Delaware that segregation bred a "sense
of inferiority" in the Negro children that directly "affects the
motivation of a child to learn" and "has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of Negro children. ... "I
Brown started a rash of school cases that soon led into other seg-
regated areas, such as public accommodations, transportation, res-
taurants, etc. 19 Several hundred cases accumulated in the Court
involving sit-ins, lie-ins etc., which were being held awaiting
decision on controlling questions already submitted. Finally, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting discrimin-
ation in places of public accommodation, and the Court held that
this abated all of the convictions, as well as prosecutions, where
the places involved came within the requirements of that Act.
The Court, as I have indicated, cannot reach out and announce
a rule of law. It must await the filing of a justiciable controversy
involving a substantial federal question. But as we have seen one
decision in a given field-such as segregation in education-spawns
other questions in related quarters. This is the reason that hun-
dreds of cases on the segregation issue reached the Court in the
first ten years of Chief Justice Warren's tenure. They started with
Brown and its companion cases in education but quickly spread
to other segregated areas. The Court did not reach out for the
cases. They were fied with it-action was demanded of it and the
Court was obligated to act. In fact it had already delayed the school
cases for some three years before the 1954 decisions came down.
Criminal cases-both state and federal-are filed in the Su-
preme Court most every day. Less than seven percent of them are
16 The consolidated cases were Brown from Kansas, Briggs v. Elliott,
from South Carolina, Davis v. County School Board from Virginia,
Gebhart v. Belton from Delaware and Bolling v. Sharpe from the
District of Columbia. The cases were consolidated on June 8, 1953
and set down for argument for the October 1954 Term on December
7-9, 1953.
17 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
18 See note 15 supra, at 494.
'9 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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ever heard. Still among them often came cases involving serious
questions under our Federal Constitution. Such a case was Griffin
v. Illinois.20 It made a simple demand and one that everyone would
agree had merit. It was that a transcript or authentic record of
some kind should be furnished to indigent defendants on their
conviction and appeal. People with money could get a transcript
and, it was argued, to deny one to the convicted poor was an in-
vidious discrimination. The Court agreed. I, for one, never dreamed
that Griffin would trigger so many serious constitutional questions
under the sixth amendment in such a short time. Yet in one decade
cases were filed in the Court and decided that overturned our
whole concept of criminal justice. The lawyers reasoned after
'Griffin: What good is a transcript to a poor person if he does not
have a lawyer?
This led to Gideon v. Wainwright,21 which required counsel
to be appointed for indigent defendants in felony prosecutions.
The question then posed was: What good a lawyer unless he is
available at every vital point in the prosecution? And Escobedo
v. Illinois,22 in the very next year, answered: The lawyer must be
available when the suspect is "focussed" upon as the accused.
Finally, the sixty-four dollar question was: When does the "focus"
occur? And the answer was: Before interrogation, which led to the
warnings of Miranda v. Arizona.23 It was written by Chief Justice
Warren.
A third arena and, perhaps the most far-reaching of all, in
which the Court was called upon to act was in the reapportionment
cases. Prior to Baker v. Carr,24 the Court had refused to take juris-
diction of these cases on the ground that they raised political
questions rather than justiciable controversies. 25 However, the
impasse that faced Tennessee was too much for the Court to
stomach. Tennessee had written into its Constitution that its leg-
islative and congressional districts must be reapportioned every
ten years. At the time Baker was argued in 1961 no district had
been reapportioned despite the command of the Constitution sixty
years before. The Court, therefore, held that the question was justi-
ciable and directed the trial court to hear it. This led to a downpour
of cases which, I daresay, involved practically every state of the
Union.
20 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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After Baker put the Court in what Mr. Justice Frankfurter
called "a political thicket," perhaps the most far-reaching of the
many opinions on the subject was Reynolds v. Sims.28 It was writ-
ten by Chief Justice Warren and enunciated the "one man, one
vote" rule and applied it to both houses of the legislature. This
case alone has controlled the disposition of at least twelve cases
from as many states, seven of which were per curiam opinions.27
There are many other branches of the law where the Chief
Justice has written the opinions of the Court. To some they may
appear more important than the ones we have mentioned. It is
sufficient to say that our forefathers conceived this nation as an
escape from tyranny and its Founders devised its basic charter as a
protection to the unalienable rights of both the rich and the poor,
the ignorant and the educated, the black and the white. And, in
that instrument, they created the Court as every man's protector
of those national privileges. The cases that I have mentioned, there-
fore, have a universal bearing and impact.
However, there is one more case that I must mention. It was
the last opinion that Chief Justice Warren handed down.28 Ever
since 1923 the Court has held that a taxpayer, as such, is without
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.2 9 The Chief
Justice in his opinion for the Court in Flast struck down this old
rubric. This opinion will go down, I say, as the most far-reaching
holding pronounced by the Chief Justice. It was long overdue and
will open the court to test cases on constitutional questions that
heretofore were often nigh unassailable.
In my eighteen years of service on the Court, I have not only
continuously studied its cases but those of other nations. If a civil-
ization is ranked according to its system of justice, I submit that
ours is the most enlightened civilization in history. Moreover, the
fifteen-year period covering Chief Justice Warren's tenure has
added more stature to our judicial system than any era in our his-
tory. Beyond question, the rights of man have been enlarged and
extended further and given more constitutional protection than
ever before. This is not to say that the Chief Justice brought this
26 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27 See Lucas v. 44th General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland
Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); and the per curiams:
Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964); Meyers v. Thigpen, 376 U.S. 902
(1964); Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964); Williams v. Moss,
378 U.S. 558 (1964); Germano v. Kerner, 375 U.S. 991 (1964); Hearne
v. Snylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964); Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 560 (1964).
28 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
29 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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about singlehandedly. He would be the first to say that it was the
Court that accomplished it. But as one who was on the Court, I
add that it might well have never been done without him. As I
have noted, he is a man of action. By this, I mean that he never
dodged any of the issues nor hid behind any of the technicalities
that afford avoidance and delay. He met the question head-on,
considered all of its ramifications and came up with his own honest
and sincere answer. He was an indefatigable worker in the vine-
yard-an equal among equals-but always responding to the duties
of Chief Justice with that humility, friendliness and integrity that
was his hallmark. His was an example that not only endeared him
to each of us but stimulated greater achievement in all of us.
When he told me of his retirement, I was sad. But selfishly I
was glad because I knew we could put in more time together
fishing, swimming, walking, attending spectator sports and just
prognosticating, as old folks do. And now that he is moving his
chambers down next to mine and our Brother Reed, we welcome
him to the ranks of the retired-an honorable estate-where to-
gether we-like the Three Musketeers-can continue to work, per-
haps harder than ever, for a more effective administration of justice.
It is most fitting that the Nebraska Law Review honor the Chief
Justice through this dedication. John Stuart Mill once said:
The worth of a state, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals
composing it... a state which dwarfs its men, in order that they
may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial
purposes--will find that with small men no great thing can really
be accomplished.80
The worth of the United States-in the long run-and the worth
of the individuals composing it will be the greater for Earl Warren
having been their Chief Justice.
TOM C. CLARK
Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court
so J. MILL, On Liberty 144 (Oxford Univ. Press 1942).
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The appointment of the Chief Justice and the decision in Brown'
shaped our lawyer lives. Just as we were children of the Roosevelt
years we were to become lawyers whose entire experience would
be shaped by rulings of the Warren Court and the American
response to them.
As law students, racial questions had been limited to briefing
a few cases in Constitutional Law. All of our fellow students at the
University of Alabama were white. Most of us were zealous middle
class seekers of fortune in corporate practice or successful political
careers. A few of us, too few, were interested in criminal and gov-
ernment practice.
A school desegregation case, Lucy v. Adams,2 to culminate in
riots in 1956 and a school house door stand in 1963 was wending its
way through the courts. But the white South of pre-1954 liberalism
was bracing for the inevitable. Some of us welcomed it.
Louisiana State University and the University of North Carolina
had done It with grace. They had integrated without violence and
so could we-we thought.
Wrong as we were about that, we were right about the rule of
law, the use of law as a precursor of social change in America.
There were others waiting in the wings, the anti-Hill-Sparkman-
Folsom Democrats who knew that the politics of race would make
leadership falter, then fail and fall from power.
Working in the Birmingham post office during one Christmas
holiday I seriously asked a Negro co-worker why he didn't become
the first Negro to enroll at the University of Alabama School of
Law rather than Howard University where he was then a student.
He laughed.
"My family fought to eat in the Depression," he said. "In the
war it was a fight to stay alive."
"Man, I'm tired of fighting."
But fight he would as would we all, for every generation must
fight for freedom. At first it was the complicated matter of enlist-
ment, of choosing sides. Brown was the catalyst and after May 17,
1954, young men and women were forced to choose sides.
The Warren Court made life difficult for those of us with a
vested interest in the southern way of life, community acceptance,
social prestige, corporate practice, and, perhaps, political office.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
2 350 U.S. 1 (1955).
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But the law, if relevant, and its practice, if important, makes for
no easy life. Justice lies in trials, not trivia, not in the antiseptic
avoidance of social controversy. The corporate board room pro-
duces secretaries of state; courtroom advocacy provides protection
from the state itself. Across the South white lawyers were con-
fronted with decisions to be made in cases having "racial over-
tones," and, from those decisions almost inevitably, the road led
to acceptance of cases embodied in the spat out phrase "civil rights."
Slowly a few white lawyers joined the ranks of Negro attorneys
on the lonely road that began in the courtrooms of the Deep South
and ended in the Supreme Court.
These lawyers, the southern Warren Court lawyers, say thank
you Mr. Chief Justice for the opportunity to face hard decisions,
to do the right thing, to take the "wrong" cases and the less than
easy way.
But Brown and its progeny do not stand alone.
On August 26, 1961, in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, we filed Sims v. Frink.3
Later after the District Court entered the nation's first provi-
sional reapportionment order 4 calling for an election under a court-
drawn plan, the Judge of Probate of Dallas County, (Selma) Ala-
bama, B. A. Reynolds, appealed to the Supreme Court. Intervenors
appealed and Reynolds v. Sims5 was born.
In Reynolds the Chief Justice wrote:
"Legislators represent people, not trees, or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."6
This correctly stated what should have been and was to be
true. But before Reynolds legislators did not in fact represent
people.
Reynolds was one more giant stride by the Warren Court to
make America live by its own promise, to make the system work on
its own terms.
In the other great field of power, equality in the administration.
of justice, the Constitution was made to come alive.
The Warren Court moved to strengthen and make fair the
three great instruments of power in a democratic society-the right
to vote; the right to speak, to listen, to write, to read, to learn; and
the right to be tried fairly.
3 205 F. Supp. 245 (M. D. Ala. 1962).
4 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M. D. Ala. 1962).
5 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6 Id. at 562.
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The Court has been condemned and praised for being "activist".
It was not "activist"; it was fair and true to the promise of the
Constitution. Perhaps since 1937, the executive and legislative
branch of our government had merely moved to contain ferment.
The Warren Court made possible the free and peaceful expression
of the people's will in a time of world and national change. Now
men who desired peaceful democratic change had hope. And first
the President, then the Congress, followed their Court and made
their "promises to keep".
Friends have been killed in these years. But neither bombings,
nor burnings, nor staccato shots in the night, nor assassination will
still the promise of a united America.
But there is more to the Warren Court than the leadership it
gave to the nation. There is Earl Warren himself. He outlasted those
words on Twentieth Street in Birmingham. The first message, "Im-
peach Earl Warren," eventually gave way to "Support Your Local
Police." When they were right they were supported. When wrong
they were told so, and, they too will be stronger and more efficient
for the efforts of Earl Warren. He had persistence and courage and
courtesy and hope and humor, ability, honor, integrity, and political
skill. These are essential for a great Chief Justice.
And he has warmth: indeed you did know him when you saw
him. You felt that warmth when he smiled and welcomed you to
the Bar of the Court. You felt it in the courtesy of his questioning,
in his comment during arguments.
But most of all the Warren Court gave us the feeling that we
too were a part of the system of justice and we too would make
this system work.
Those on the other side of our Constitution can feel that. It
was not we "outsiders" who were outsiders, it was they. Racism,
separatism, brutality, discrimination, attempting to quiet the
speaker in or out of the legislature or the newspaper editor, or the
standing of a lonely, illiterate man against the state without counsel,
and the deprivation to some men by others of a voice in determining
their own affairs is now abroad in our land. The Warren Court gave
hope to the poor, the oppressed, and the weak. It defended them
against the tyranny of the majority and, it defended the majority
against the tyranny of an electoral minority.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren understands the political America,
the workings of local, state and national government and the capa-
city of our institutions. He is refutation of the belief that no man
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should be a judge who has no judicial experience. His years have
proved that bar association control of judiciary selection would
sap life from the courts as institutions responsive to change in a
complicated society. It was from the rough and tumble of politics
that the Chief Justice came. It was from this life that his under-
standing of America came.
So thank you Mr. Chief Justice for fifteen years of building
Constitutional walls of protection and bridges of equal access for
all Americans.
Several years ago I took my wife and our then eleven year old
son to the ball game at Yankee stadium. Searching for a taxicab to
the airport we stood near the Yankee club house exit.
Hundreds of children clamored for autographs from Ralph Houk
and shouted 'ogi!" "Yogi!". You and two other men walked un-
noticed to a waiting automobile.
My son waved at you. You waved back.
I felt it strange that children sought the Yankee catcher and let
the Chief Justice of the United States, out-of-uniform and unrecog-
nized, walk by.
But those children, were happily seeking their own heroes at an
age when others not too long ago marched stiff-legged as a part of
the Hitler Youth.
Our children do not yet have an equal chance to grapple with
the opportunity that is the hope of this land but the Warren Court
has opened doors and kept alive the chance that their dreams may
be realized. And perhaps our children will do more to make a still
better life for all of us.
And then, I thought-why should those children have recognized
You. It sometimes takes time for men, let alone children to recog-
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